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We describe a bias in moral judgment in which the mere existence of other
victims reduces assessments of the harm suffered by each harmed individual. Three
experiments support the seemingly paradoxical relationship between the number of
harmed individuals and the perceived severity of the harming act. In Experiment 1a,
participants expressed lower punitive intentions toward a perpetrator of an unethical act
that hurt multiple people and assigned lower monetary compensation to each victim
than did those who judged a similar act that harmed only one person. In Experiment 1b,
participants displayed greater emotional involvement in the case of a single victim than
when there were multiple victims, regardless of whether the victims were unrelated and
unaware of each other or constituted a group. Experiment 2 measured the responses
of the victims themselves. Participants received false performance feedback on a task
before being informed that they had been deceived. Victims who were deceived alone
reported more negative feelings and judged the deception as more immoral than did
those who knew that others had been deceived as well. Taken together, these results
suggest that a victim’s plight is perceived as less severe when others share it, and this
bias is common to both third-party judges and victims.
Keywords: moral judgments, deception, individual victims, multiple victims, identifiability, attribution
INTRODUCTION
The CNBC television series CNBC’s “American Greed” (2007) tells the story of Barry Hunt who
solicited money from several people across the United States by presenting them with phony
investment opportunities and promising them high returns only to disappear with their savings.
The show presents Elaine Nelson, one of Hunt’s victims, who was left penniless after having
invested all of her money in one of Hunt’s companies. When contacted by FBI agents, Ms.
Nelson was told about Hunt’s other successful con operations. Should the knowledge that there
are additional victims increase Barry Hunt’s moral liability for his actions? From both a legal and
a normative perspective, the answer is undoubtedly “yes.” When all else is equal, a crime against
several people causes more overall harm than a similar crime against one person, and should carry
more severe punishment as is the case in the criminal code. Theoretical models of ethical judgment
take a similar view. According to the Moral Intensity Model (Jones, 1991, p. 374), “an act that
causes 1,000 people to suffer a particular injury is of greater magnitude of consequence than an act
that causes 10 people to suffer the same injury.”
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However, from a psychological perspective, people may not
adhere to this normative principle. Although moral judgments of
harmful acts are greatly influenced by assessments of the harm
they caused (e.g., Baron and Hershey, 1988; Mazzocco et al.,
2004; Gino et al., 2009), the relationship between the two is not
monotonic. This is particularly evident with regard to the number
of victims. Research has repeatedly found that numerosity has
a significant negative impact on people’s affective reactions.
For example, life-saving interventions are often perceived as
more beneficial when fewer lives are at risk (Fetherstonhaugh
et al., 1997). Similarly, a single suffering victim produces a
stronger emotional involvement than many victims (Cameron
and Payne, 2011; Kogut, 2011), and the existence of more
victims is associated with lower willingness to donate money
for the victim’s (or victims’) cause. For example, Västfjäll, Peters
and Slovic (see Slovic, 2007) gave a group of participants the
opportunity to donate money to help one starving child in Africa
and another group the opportunity to help a similar child in
distress. A third group was given the opportunity to help both
children. Participants’ affective reactions, as well as the amounts
donated, were significantly lower in the combined condition
than in any of the individual-victim conditions. This effect is
not restricted to life-threatening situations: in another study,
participants judged a financial fraud as more severe and thus
deserving of more severe punishment when it harmed three
victims than when it harmed a group of thirty (Nordgren and
McDonnell, 2010).
Nordgren and McDonnell (2010) explained their findings
in terms of the identifiable victim effect (e.g., Small and
Loewenstein, 2003; Small et al., 2007). Briefly, this effect refers to
people’s greater sympathy and willingness to help personalized,
single victims (who are presented with some information that
distinguishes them from others) than “statistical victims” who
are perceived as a faceless mass. Although the classic studies on
this effect employed completely different dependent measures
(e.g., helping behavior, willingness to donate) and did not test the
effect of number of victims directly, they propose a reasonable
explanation for the greater impact of a single identifiable victim
in terms of both affective reactions (i.e., heightened compassion
and sympathy) and generosity (i.e., greater willingness to
donate). Nordgren and McDonnell (2010) argued that victim
identifiability is also a central mechanism underlying judgments
of intentionally harmful acts. For instance, they demonstrated
that increasing the identifiability of one member of the victim
group attenuates the effect of group size on judgments of harm.
Note that the studies cited above examined the participants’
affective reactions and/or willingness to help from a bystander’s
perspective. Their judgments may be fundamentally different
from those of the victim of a harmful act. For example, the victim
may materially benefit from the presence of other victims who
share her plight by receiving social support and an opportunity
to join forces. As a result, the perceived harm caused by the
transgression to each individual victim may be alleviated, leading
to more forgiving judgments than what the normative approaches
would suggest.
This study was designed to extend previous findings of the
number of harmed individuals on people’s moral judgment in
several ways. First, we examined this effect in everyday situations
where the victim was in no physical danger. Second, whereas
most studies have measured people’s willingness to actively help
victims, we examined the participants’ moral judgments and
assessments of the victims’ suffering independently of any need
to take action. Third, whereas earlier work has focused on
judgments by third party participants who were uninvolved
in the situation, no study, to the best of our knowledge, has
examined the judgments and reactions of the victims themselves.
Here, we examined whether individuals who were harmed would
perceive their own suffering as less severe when they were
informed that others had been harmed as well. Finally, we probed
previous arguments that have associated victim numerosity with
identifiability. By measuring the victims’ own reactions, we were
able to manipulate group size while ensuring that the targets
were equally identifiable in both single and multiple victim
conditions.
We report results from three experiments. Experiments 1a
and 1b used hypothetical scenarios that varied the number of
victims. These experiments examined people’s harm assessment
and emotions from a bystander’s point of view. In Experiment 2,
the actual victims of the harmful act were the participants
themselves. Following the realization of their transgression, we
measured participants’ feelings and attitudes toward that act. We
hypothesized that across all three studies, a transgression would
be perceived as less harmful and less immoral when it affected
multiple individuals than when it harmed only one.
EXPERIMENT 1a
Experiment 1a tested the effect of multiple victims on evaluations
of a transgression, both with regard to the harm suffered by each
victim and the overall severity of the act. In a three-group design,
we presented participants with a scenario describing a harmful
act and varied the number of individuals affected by it. We then
measured participants’ judgments and attitudes toward the act.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty-seven members of a U.S. university’s online
participant pool (84 female, Mean age= 34.10 years, SD= 12.08)
were recruited to participate in a web-based study for a 1 in 10
chance of winning a $10 Amazon gift card. Participants signed an
online consent form at the beginning of the experiment, and were
debriefed at the end.
Procedure
The experiment used a three-group design. In each condition,
participants read a hypothetical story describing Dr. Stillman,
a dentist and an avid angler, who is invited to go on a long
weekend fishing trip and decides to reschedule patients who are
in pain and waiting for treatment. Each participant read one of
three versions of the scenario, which were all identical except for
the number of patients who were affected by the dentist’s trip.
Participants in one condition read about one patient, another
about three patients, whereas in the third condition, participants
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read about 10 patients whose appointments were postponed at
the last minute by the dentist.
After reading the scenario, participants rated their attitudes
toward the behavior described in the scenario. Specifically, they
assessed the severity of the harm suffered by an individual victim
by estimating the smallest monetary amount they would consider
a sufficient financial compensation for each victim. Participants
also rated their support for suspending the dentist’s license to
practice dental work and for filing a civil lawsuit against him.
These three items were presented in a random order. Finally,
we measured participants’ emotional reactions by asking them to
indicate the extent to which they think the patients felt hurt by
the dentist’s act, the extent to which they perceived the dentist
as guilty for the patients’ suffering, and their sympathy for the
victim(s). Participants’ emotional responses were measured on a
continuous scale ranging from 0 (no emotion at all) to 10 (the
strongest possible emotion).
Results
We conducted a one-way ANOVA to measure the effect of the
total number of victims on participants’ estimates of the lowest
sufficient compensation for an individual victim. The analysis
revealed a significant main effect for the number of victims
[F(2,124) = 4.45, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.07]. A planned contrast
between the single-victim condition and the two multiple -victim
conditions found that the minimal sufficient compensation per
victim was about twice the estimated amount when there was
only one harmed individual compared to three or ten victims
[t(124) = 2.90, p = 0.004, d = 0.52]. When there were three
versus ten victims, there was no significant difference in the
minimal compensation [t(124) = −0.99, p = 0.32, d = −0.18]
(See Table 1).
The two measures of participants’ attitudes toward a
suspension of the dentist’s license and a malpractice lawsuit
against him were highly correlated (r = 0.72); therefore, we
calculated the average of the two for each participant and
conducted a one-way ANOVA on participants’ support for
these sanctions. As shown in Table 1, participants were more
supportive of sanctions against the dentist when fewer victims
were harmed by his behavior [F(2,124) = 6.18, p = 0.003,
η2p = 0.09]. A planned contrast between the single victim
condition and the multiple victim conditions confirmed our main
hypothesis [t(124) = 3.46, p = 0.001, d = 0.62]: participants
were significantly more willing to instigate sanctions against
a perpetrator who had harmed a single victim than against
TABLE 1 | Perceptions of deserved compensation for each individual
victim and punishability of the act (Means and SD’s), by the total number
of victims in Experiment 1a.
Total number
of victims
Compensation
for the individual
victim (SD)
Willingness to instigate
sanctions against the
agent (SD)
1 2561.84 (3172.66) 5.72 (3.09)
3 981.06 (1075.53) 3.23 (2.66)
10 1444.38 (1907.03) 4.15 (2.81)
a person who had harmed several victims. No significant
difference was found between the two multiple victim conditions
[t(124) = −1.37, p = 0.17, d = −0.24]. We also found no
significant intergroup difference for the emotional reaction items
(All Fs< 1, see Table 2).
Discussion
Experiment 1a found that the mere existence of additional victims
affected people’s assessments of an unethical act. A patient was
perceived to be deserving of less compensation when other
patients were harmed by the dentist’s act than when she was a
single victim. This bias in participants’ perceptions was strong
enough to affect their perceptions of the overall severity of the act:
when several patients suffered (either three or ten), participants’
support for instigating sanctions on the agent decreased rather
than increased.
However, a few caveats should be considered. First, affective
reactions to the dentist’s transgression were not significantly
different between conditions. This may suggest that emotional
reactions and psychophysical numbing did not play a significant
role in determining the effect on moral judgment or punitive
motives. Alternatively, the order in which we administered
the questionnaire items may have attenuated the emotional
effect. Since we measured the participants’ affective reactions
after measuring their willingness to prosecute the dentist and
compensate his patients, the consideration of punitive actions
may have relieved some of the negative feelings (c.f., Ayal and
Gino, 2011; Barkan et al., 2012). In Experiment 1b we focused on
participants’ affective reactions, and measured them immediately
after manipulating the number of victims.
Experiment 1b addressed two other alternative explanations
for Study 1a. First, in the two multiple victim conditions,
participants could have perceived the victims as an entitative,
communicating group. In such settings group members can
provide support to each other, which is not available to a single
victim. Such group support may actually alleviate the victim’s
suffering, and this in turn may reduce punitive intentions in
these settings. Second, it could be argued that the harm in
the single victim case was more easily avoidable. When there
was only one patient waiting, the dentist could have easily
treated this patient and still been able to go on the trip,
but having many appointments forced the dentist to choose
between moving all the appointments or canceling the trip
altogether. Therefore, harming a single victim may be less
harmful overall, but also more easily avoidable and therefore
deserving of harsher punishment. In Experiment 1b we addressed
these concerns.
EXPERIMENT 1b
Similar to Experiments 1a and 1b was based on a hypothetical
scenario, albeit in a context which is more frequently associated
with unethical acts: financial consulting. The victims in this
story were clients of a financial advisor whose unprofessional,
negligent behavior caused substantial losses to their retirement
savings. In a three-group design, we varied the number and
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TABLE 2 | Emotional reactions (Means and SD’s) by the total number of harmed patients in Experiment 1a.
Total # of harmed patients Sadness (SD) Anger (SD) Sympathy (SD) Guilt (SD) Feeling hurt (SD)
1 4.14 (3.12) 5.63 (3.08) 7.46 (2.31) 7.00 (2.61) 6.09 (2.56)
3 4.27 (3.20) 5.60 (2.41) 7.38 (1.72) 7.25 (2.27) 6.20 (2.10)
10 4.08 (2.62) 5.39 (2.51) 6.98 (2.30) 7.20 (2.26) 6.11 (2.07)
The scale ranges from 0 (weakest) to 10 (strongest).
organization of the victims of the financial advisor’s negligence.
The scenarios were constructed to have a single victim, five
unrelated victims (who had no contact with or awareness of each
other), or a group of five clients who had a joint portfolio which
the financial advisor handled. The two multiple victim conditions
were designed to rectify two caveats related to Experiment 1a.
The first was the mere existence of multiple victims and the
victims’ subjective experience in dealing with harm alone or in
a group. The second was the number of victims as a function
of the ease with which the harm could be avoided by the
transgressor.
Method
Participants
Ninety-one members of a U.S. university’s online participant pool
(54 Female, Mean age = 35.5 years, SD = 13.2) participated in
this experiment in exchange for a 1 in 10 chance of winning a $10
Amazon gift card. Participants signed an online consent form at
the beginning of the experiment and were debriefed at the end.
Procedure
Participants completed the study online. The experiment began
by reading a story about a financial advisor named Jeff who
specializes in investments for retirement plans. One day Jeff reads
an analyst’s report that forecasts a sharp drop in the market and
strongly recommends selling S&P 500 index stocks as quickly as
possible. Despite placing this recommendation at the top of his
to-do list, Jeff leaves work early to meet a friend, without touching
his clients’ portfolios. The next morning the stock market falls
and each client whose portfolio had index shares lost $2,500 of
the value of the stock. We specified that each client had $20,000
worth of S&P 500 shares the previous day, and that this value
declined to $17,500. One version of the story included one such
client, another presented five unrelated clients and the third was
about a group of five clients who had opened a joint plan together,
managed by Jeff.
After reading the story, participants evaluated the victims’
experience of the consequences of Jeff ’s behavior. They were
asked to refer to the experience of each client and rate the extent
to which the client was hurt by the advisor’s behavior, the extent
to which trust was violated between the client and the advisor, the
level of guilt the advisor should feel and how bad they would feel
if they were in the client’s shoes. These responses were measured
on a continuous scale ranging from 0 to 10, in which the lowest
and highest points were specified (e.g., 0 = “Not hurt at all”;
10 = “More hurt than he will ever be in his life”). The order of
presentation of the questions was randomized.
Results
The judgment items of the perceived harm, the extent to which
trust was violated, and the perceived guilt of the transgressor had
high inter-item reliability (α= 0.84). Therefore, we calculated the
means of these three items. We conducted a one-way ANOVA on
this combined factor to measure the effect of the total number
of victims on participants’ assessments. The ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect for the number of victims [F(2,89)= 3.15,
p = 0.048, η2p = 0.07]. The first planned contrast, which tested
whether the perceived suffering of an individual victim decreased
when other victims existed, revealed a significant difference
between the single victim condition and the multiple victim
conditions. Participants’ emotional responses in the individual
victim condition were significantly more extreme (M = 6.34,
SD = 1.25) than in the multiple-victim groups [(M = 5.63,
SD= 1.40), t(89)= 2.39, p= 0.02, d= 0.54]. The second contrast,
which tested whether each victim’s suffering was alleviated
by being part of an entitative group, revealed no significant
difference between the five isolated victims condition and the
group of victims condition [t(89) = −0.51, p = 0.61, d = 0.25].
Table 3 lists the group means and standard deviations of these
measures.
Discussion
Experiment 1b replicated and expanded the findings of
Experiment 1a. This experiment focused on participants’ affective
reactions, and measured them immediately after administering
the number of victims manipulation. Consistent with our
hypothesis, the mere existence of additional harmed individuals
decreased the perceived harm suffered by each individual. A loss
of $2,500 was considered more painful when the victim of the loss
was the only one, compared to when there were other people who
also lost $2,500 each, regardless of whether the group members
were in contact or not. Similarly, the participants judged the
investment counselor to bear more guilt (rather than less guilt)
when a single client was affected by his misbehavior.
Experiment 1b helps to refute the possibility that participants
may have recognized some implied advantages to situations
TABLE 3 | Emotional responses, by the total number of harmed clients in
Experiment 1b.
# of clients affected by Jeff’s action Mean emotional response (SD)
Single client 6.34 (1.25)
5 isolated clients 5.55 (1.22)
5 connected clients 5.91 (1.63)
The scale ranges from 0 (weakest) to 10 (strongest).
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where several victims are involved, such as getting social
support from other victims. In Experiment 1b we varied
whether the multiple victims were isolated or in a group. We
found no significant differences between these two conditions,
suggesting that the mere knowledge (by the judge, if not by
the victim) that other victims exist was sufficient to produce
this effect. Finally, Experiment 1b addressed the possibility
that the severity of judgment levied on the perpetrator in
the single victim condition could stem from perceiving the
harm to a single victim as easier to avoid. In the current
experiment, the harmful act was equally avoidable in all
conditions, but the negative reactions in the single victim
condition were still more extreme than in the multiple victim
conditions.
Our results are consistent with those reported in Nordgren
and McDonnell (2010), who found that a hypothetical fraud was
judged as worse (and deserving of more severe punishment)
when it affected a smaller number of victims. Nordgren and
McDonnell (2010) explained their findings as the result of
greater victim identifiability in the single victim condition.
In the current experiment, however, all the victims were
equally anonymous, but participants seemed to have judged
the fact that the single victim was unique to accrue the harm
suffered. In the following experiment, we kept all victims equally
identified to the judges, by eliciting judgments from the victims
themselves.
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 sought to generalize the effect observed in the
first two experiments in two ways. Whereas Experiments 1a
and 1b examined participants’ intuitions regarding the harm
suffered by others, the present experiment tested participants’
actual experiences as victims. Participants experienced situations
where they learned they had received ostensibly professional (but
false) feedback on their performance on a cognitive task. We
varied the number of affected individuals between groups and
investigated whether such personally experienced harm would
also be perceived as more benign and as less immoral when they
were not the only ones subjected to it.
Experiment 2 also provided an additional test of the
identifiability account for the findings described above. Victims
can be identifiable or unidentifiable when judged by others, but
not when they are the target of their own assessments. Thus, if
identifiability is the underlying mechanism of the perverse effect
of the number of victims on moral judgment and emotional
involvement, this effect should not be observed in the victims’
reactions to the harm each of them experiences.
Method
Participants
Eighty-one undergraduate students at an Israeli university (51
Female; mean age = 29.8 years, SD = 7.32) volunteered to
participate in an online experiment. The participants signed an
online consent form at the beginning of the experiment, and were
debriefed at the end.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2
(feedback type: benign vs. harmful) by 2 (target of deception:
individual vs. multiple) between-subjects design. After providing
general demographic information, participants completed a
modified version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;
Frederick, 2005) followed by a 10-item personality test (TIPI;
Gosling et al., 2003) translated into Hebrew.
Next, participants received (false) feedback, ostensibly
computed online based on their performance on the CRT. In
the benign feedback condition, participants were told that their
performance was two standard deviations above the mean of the
entire sample, whereas those in the harmful feedback condition
were told that their performance was two standard deviations
below the mean. Following a short filler task (presented as “a
complementary test aimed to validate the results of the first
analytical test”), participants were given a disclaimer about the
deception. Half of the participants (the multiple victim condition)
were told that they, as well as all participants in the experiment,
had received false feedback in the previous stage. The other half
(the individual victim condition) were told that the decision to
deceive them was based on their score on the TIPI test. Finally,
participants were asked to rate the morality of the false feedback
given by the researchers, and to indicate the extent to which
they felt hurt, angry, disappointed, embarrassed, betrayed and/or
humiliated by what happened (both were measured on a 0–5
scale).
Results
Perceived Immorality
A 2 (feedback type: benign vs. harmful) by 2 (target of deception:
individual vs. multiple) ANOVA revealed a main effect for the
target of deception [F(1,77) = 4.03, p = 0.047, η2p = 0.05]. As
predicted, participants in the individual target condition rated the
act as significantly more immoral (M = 2.87, SD = 1.26) than
those who were told that all the other participants were treated as
they had been (M= 2.30, SD= 1.34). The other effects – feedback
type and interaction – were non-significant. Table 4 presents the
means and standard deviations for all four conditions.
Negative Feelings
Participants’ reported negative feelings after receiving the
disclaimer regarding the deception had high inter-item reliability
(Cronbach’s α = 0.81). Therefore, we calculated an index based
on the average of these six items, which served as the target for
the following analyses.
The 2 (feedback type: benign vs. harmful) by 2 (target
of deception: individual vs. multiple) ANOVA indicated a
TABLE 4 | Means (SD’s) of perceived immorality of the act as a function of
the feedback type and the deception target in Experiment 2.
hhhhhhhhhhhhTarget of deception
Feedback
Benign Harmful
Individual 2.94 (1.39) 2.81 (1.17)
Multiple 2.40 (1.53) 2.17 (1.04)
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significant interaction between feedback type and the target of
deception [F(1,77) = 4.11, p = 0.046, η2p = 0.05]. Simple effects
tests showed that among participants in the harmful feedback
condition, those who believed they were deceived based on
their personal traits rated their negative feelings as more intense
[M = 1.60, SD = 0.83] than those who believed others were also
treated the same way [M = 1.18, SD = 0.29]. However, among
those who received the benign feedback, there was no difference
in the extent of negative feelings between the two conditions
of target of deception (F < 1). Moreover, the means indicated
an opposite trend, such that negative feeling ratings were lower
for participants who believed they were the only ones who had
been deceived than those who were told that all the others were
treated as they had been (see Table 5). Finally, although 63% of
our participants were female, we did not find evidence for gender
differences that could account for the results.
Discussion
Experiment 2 found that the perverse effect of additional victims
on the judgment of a transgression was exhibited not only by
non-involved observers or readers of hypothetical scenarios,
but also by the actual victims of a real, albeit not very severe
transgression. Participants who had been deceived judged the
deception as less immoral and less harmful to them when they
were told that other participants had also been deceived, relative
to when they thought they were the only victims of deception.
Interestingly, participants assessed the deception of an individual
victim as more immoral, regardless of whether the feedback was
benign or harmful. However, their emotional reports portrayed
a different picture. Whereas participants in the harmful feedback
condition reported greater negative feelings when the feedback
was individually targeted, those who were deceived in a self-
serving manner showed quite similar levels of negative feelings,
whether the deception they experienced was individually oriented
or not.
These findings suggest that participants may have perceived
the mere existence of others as helpful in alleviating their pain,
which is consistent with the beliefs conveyed by the readers of the
hypothetical scenarios in Experiments 1a and 1b. Our findings
challenge the association between the number of victims and their
perceived identifiability as a necessary condition for this effect,
since the judges of the transgression in this experiment were also
the victims and their own identifiability was equally high in all
conditions.
In this experiment, participants experienced actual harm
characterized by one of two degrees of severity. Some received
false feedback that was positive before learning that it was
deceitful, whereas others were given false feedback suggesting
TABLE 5 | Expressed negative feelings (Means and SD’s) a function of the
feedback type and the deception target in Experiment 2.
hhhhhhhhhhhhTarget of deception
Feedback
Benign Harmful
Individual 1.33 (0.43) 1.60 (0.83)
Multiple 1.49 (0.72) 1.18 (0.29)
they were inferior to their peers. Note, however, that we measured
participants’ reactions after we informed them not only about
having been deceived but also about the content of the deception
and the truth; i.e., that there was no information suggesting they
were either superior or inferior to others in the measures we
collected. This disclaimer may have evoked qualitatively different
emotional reactions, which may have accounted in part for
participants’ subsequent responses. In the impersonal conditions,
those who were informed that they were not “cognitively inferior”
may have felt relieved, whereas those who were informed that
their “superiority” was in fact a product of deceit may have
felt disappointment. In the personal condition, however, the
negative reaction matched the valence of the feedback, even
after participants were informed that this feedback was false.
This might explain the differences between the patterns we
observed in moral judgments and those that were observed in the
participants’ emotional reactions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present work replicates and extends findings on the effect of
the number of victims on harm perception and moral judgment.
Our findings seem to indicate a bias in moral judgment and in
assessment of harm such that a transgression affecting several
individuals was paradoxically judged as less (rather than more)
severe and immoral than one affecting a single victim. This
was exhibited not only by participants who judged the harmful
act from an external point of view, but also when they were
the victims themselves. The effect was independent of the
physical presence of other victims, or the individual’s ability
to communicate with them. Rather, simply knowing that other
victims exist reduced reported suffering as well as the extent to
which they judged the perpetrator’s behavior as immoral.
Our findings are relevant to studies on helping behaviors (e.g.,
Kogut and Ritov, 2005; Slovic, 2007) and the relationship between
the number of individuals in need of help and the willingness
to offer it. These studies have found that the willingness to offer
help or a monetary donation sharply decreased as the number
of individuals in need increased. However, whereas these works
have focused on people’s decisions about whether and to what
extent to actively help the victims, the bias we found did not
depend on any expectation that the participants would take
action.
Our findings challenge the association between the number of
victims and their perceived identifiability as a necessary condition
for this effect. In Experiment 2, we elicited the victims’ reactions
to the transgression committed against them. These victims were
obviously identifiable to themselves. Nonetheless, we found that
the effect persisted in both cases such that the harm suffered by a
lone victim was judged as more severe than the harm suffered by
one of several victims.
Future Directions and Limitations
Our findings provide preliminary evidence for a bias in moral
judgment in which the mere existence of other victims reduces
assessments of the harm suffered by each harmed individual.
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This bias was replicated in our three studies, but nonetheless
is still subject to several different explanations and boundary
conditions. For example, knowing of the existence of many more
victims may trigger a dispositional attribution. According to
Attribution Theory (Kelley, 1973), an outcome is characterized
by low consensus when it is observed on the focal person but
not on others. Low consensus increases the extent to which the
outcome is attributed to the person’s character or skill rather than
to external factors. Judges of the single victim may have construed
the fact that no other person was harmed to mean that the
victim was somewhat responsible for the outcome; conversely,
the presence of other victims may have increased the perceived
consensus of their suffering, which in turn could have increased
the external attribution of this outcome.
Another possible explanation is that individual and multiple
victims provide different reference points for judgments. Because
harm suffered by a victim is very difficult to perceive in absolute
terms, people may resort to comparative processes to assess this
harm. With no obvious reference point against which this harm
can be measured, they may compare a victim’s state to her state
before the act or to that of society in general (Festinger, 1954).
In contrast, the other concrete victims of the same act provide
readily available reference points for such comparisons. The
judge realizes that the victim’s pain is no worse than that suffered
her peers, and this result in lower assessment of each victim’s
pain. This account suggests that people’s moral judgments are
determined by the available reference points rather than by the
objective level of harm caused by the act.
A third explanation stems from the human tendency to think
heuristically. People may apply assumptions to their judgments,
such as that the existence of other victims has actual benefits,
e.g., moral support or cooperation. People might also make a
calculation where the magnitude of the harm is “distributed”
across several recipients. In some cases, there could be a sound
reason for the reduction in the severity of moral judgment when
multiple victims are concerned. Nevertheless, as our experiments
demonstrate, people might overgeneralize their intuitive rules to
situations where the existence of other victims cannot provide
any alleviation of the individual victim’s pain.
Finally, it is worth noting that the scope of the current study
was limited to relatively mild harm, suffered by few individuals.
This raises questions as to whether the same mechanism can
be generalized to cases where harm that is more significant is
evoked on much larger scales. The recent Volkswagen emission
cheating scandal that was widely covered in the media can serve
as a recent example. About 500,000 owners were affected in
the US, compared to 11 million across the rest of the world.
Would Americans have judged the acts of the VW cooperation
more severely had fewer victims been affected? Such important
questions call for future studies that investigate moral judgments
in case studies from the field, especially ones involving large-scale
harm.
CONCLUSION
As long as the legal system incorporates the magnitude of harm
committed by transgressors in the evaluation of punishment, fair
treatment by the law requires accurate appraisal of harm. Our
findings show that intuitive assessments of harm and immorality
are prone to a systematic bias in which the harm done to each
of many victims is often judged less severely than harm done to
one victim. This bias is shared by third-party judges and victims
alike. Overcoming this bias may help to maintain a more balanced
system of assessing punishment, entitlement, and retribution.
Until then, victims’ only consolation is that their misery loves
company.
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